Abstract: This paper answers two timely, important research questions. Has the accuracy of statistical early warning models declined in recent years as the economic environment faced by banks has become more volatile? Has it become necessary to frequently respecify or re-estimate these models to produce reasonably accurate forecasts of bank risk?
I. Introduction
age. This persistent level of accuracy suggests that relatively simple EWMs continue to be useful supervisory tools, even if they are not respecified or re-estimated frequently.
In addition, the supplemental analysis of forecast accuracy indicates that a considerable number of banks categorized as Type II errors by the models in each forecast period appear to be high risk ex post. The implication is that the "true" Type II error rates of the models are lower than the conventional figures reported in the tables.
In the next section, relevant studies are briefly reviewed. Section III details the construction of the Cox models used in the study. The estimation results are presented in section IV. Model forecasting accuracy is discussed in section V. Section VI presents a summary of the results and conclusions.
II. Short Review of Previous Research
Many previous studies have investigated EWMs for banks, but a hazard model approach was used in a relatively small number of them. Only four papers (Lane, Looney, and Wansley [1986] ; Whalen [1991] ; Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes [2002] ; and Whalen [2005] ) are early warning studies, in which the focus is on developing and testing the out-of-sample accuracy of models designed to predict bank risk. 3 None of the studies thoroughly examines the relationship between model age and forecasting accuracy. The first two studies focus on bank failure and use models with a maximum time horizon of two years. In general, the set of independent variables found to be significant in these studies consists of ratios constructed from regulatory call reports that are standard indicators of various dimensions of bank risk.
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Unlike Lane, Looney and Wansley (1986) and Whalen (1991) , Gropp et al. attempt to model the risk of a nonsupervisory ratings downgrade for a relatively small sample of European Union banks. More specifically, Gropp et al. define a downgrade as a reduction in a bank's Fitch-IBCA financial strength rating to a grade of C or below. Given the stated definition of a Clevel rating, this dichotomy between low risk and high risk is very similar to the approach used in this paper. 5 The authors note the benefits of using such a risk measure in EWMs when failures are rare. They focus on whether variables constructed from equity and bond market price and yield data are useful leading indicators of the risk of publicly traded banks. They do not examine the classification accuracy of their estimated models out-of-sample.
Whalen (2005) develops a Cox proportional hazard model that is designed to predict the probability that a low-risk community bank will be downgraded to high-risk status over an eightquarter time horizon. The risk dichotomy is made on the basis of CAMELS composite supervisory ratings, with a score of 2 separating the low and high-risk groups. The out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of the hazard model estimated at three different points in time is examined and compared with two simpler supervisory screens for only a single forecast period. In general, the hazard models are found to produce relatively accurate risk classifications out-of-sample.
Model age does not appear to have a marked impact on classification accuracy. The hazard models are also found to be considerably more accurate than two simpler supervisory screens.
5 A C-rated bank is defined as "an adequate bank that, however, possesses one or more troublesome aspects." See Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes (2002) , appendix 2: 53. Banks with composite ratings of 3 "exhibit some degree of supervisory concern in one or more … areas." See Federal Reserve System's Commercial Bank Examination Manual (1997): A.5020.1, 2. Available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cbem/cbem.pdf.
III. Construction of Cox CAMELS Downgrade Model

Measure of Risk
Statistical EWMs can be designed to produce estimates of a variety of indices of bank risk. Each of these potential risk measures has advantages and disadvantages. In this study, the target bank risk measure is based on supervisory ratings. More precisely, the model developed is designed to produce estimates of the probability that a low risk bank will be subsequently downgraded to high risk status over an eight-quarter time period. Banks are designated "low risk" if they have CAMELS composite scores of 1 or 2. Banks with composite CAMELS scores above 2 are classified as high risk.
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with using supervisory ratings-based measures of risk in a statistical EWM. The main advantage of this approach is that exam ratings are thought to be highly accurate measures of bank condition (at least of current condition) because they reflect supervisory assessments of private information (e.g., the quality of nontraded loans and an institution's management) that may be superior to that available to outside analysts. In addition, accurate CAMELS prediction or downgrade models are useful to supervisors. Identifying low-risk banks likely to be downgraded gives supervisors time to limit any moral hazard behavior or assist in the rehabilitation of institutions. Downgrade models might also be used to select the apparently low-risk banks that should be examined sooner rather than later. Another advantage of using supervisory ratings as the risk metric is that it permits model estimation in time periods in which other high-risk events like failure are rare.
There are also disadvantages to using supervisory assessments when modeling bank risk.
Such ratings reflect subjective judgments on the part of examiners, and these judgments may differ across banks or change over time (e.g., banks in different size classes might be rated according to different criteria, or examination standards could change for all banks over time). In addition, the precise linkage between the ratings and expected conditions in the future can be unclear. For example, a composite score of 5 indicates a high likelihood of failure within a relatively short time, despite preventive measures. The signals provided by CAMELS scores of 3 and 4 are less clear, as is the incremental impact of moving up or down the rating scale by 1 or more rating points. Furthermore, when model predictions and actual ratings disagree, it is not clear which is the correct indicator of a bank's true risk.
Yet another potential problem, especially in the case of early warning hazard models that explicitly focus on the timing of the risk event, is that ratings reflect supervisory judgments about a bank's condition at a particular moment in time. Historically, such assessments have been made only on the basis of an on-site full-scope exam. Because such exams typically recur with a lag of four quarters or more, and the length of the lag might reflect any number of factors, the point when supervisors recognize a change in bank risk and revise a rating might not necessarily coincide closely with the moment when the change in risk could have been discerned if the bank were examined earlier. This problem, however, has been mitigated in recent years by the adoption of quarterly "periodic monitoring" of national banks by supervisors. 6 This monitoring can be off-site and can result in changes in supervisory ratings and on-site exam timing. As a result, exam ratings are likely to be better contemporaneous risk indicators than they have been in the past.
Another potential problem with ratings-based risk measures is that it may be difficult to estimate reliable models during periods when there are few banks in some ratings classes or when few downgrades occur. This circumstance is not unique to this sort of risk measure, and in fact appears to be a much less serious problem, in recent periods, than if a failure-based risk measure were used instead.
In summary, a series of CAMELS downgrade models are estimated in this paper. 7 Each model generates estimates of the probability that a bank rated 1 or 2 at a given year-end will be subsequently downgraded to a rating of 3, 4, or 5 over the eight-quarter period beginning in the second quarter of the subsequent year. 8 In all of the time periods examined in this study, there were enough rating downgrades for reliable model estimates.
Hazard Downgrade Model
The focus of any hazard model is the time that elapses from the moment that observation of the sample subjects begins until some event of interest occurs, the subject exits the sample for some other reason, or the period of observation ends. Conventionally, subjects that experience the event of interest during the observation period are referred to as failures, and the time at which this occurs is referred to as time to failure. Conversely, those that do not fail over the entire observation period are referred to as survivors. Subjects that survive or disappear from the sample before the end of the observation period without experiencing the event of interest are referred to as censored.
The time to failure for the subjects in the sample is assumed to be a random variable with a probability distribution. The probability distribution of time to failure can be expressed in 7 There are other possible risk indicators (e.g., private market debt ratings, or measures based on equity or bond prices) that could be the focus of EWMs, but generally these are relevant only for larger banking companies and were not considered. different ways. One convenient way to express this distribution is through the related hazard function. A hazard function for a particular value of event time gives the instantaneous risk that an event will occur at the given time, t, for a subject with a given set of characteristics, given that the subject has not experienced the event prior to t.
A number of hazard models may be used in the analysis. They vary somewhat in form and make different assumptions about how the baseline hazard varies over time. This paper uses various estimated versions of a Cox proportional hazards model. In the case of a Cox model, the hazard function has the following general form:
the instantaneous risk of an event for subject j at time t, given its relevant characteristics reflected in the set of variables included in X.
h 0 (t) = the baseline hazard for time period t X j B = X j represents a vector of variables describing relevant characteristics of subject j presumed to influence the hazard, and B represents a corresponding vector of weights that describe how each characteristic variable influences the hazard.
Another way to express this same probability distribution of event times is through the related survivor function. The survivor function gives the probability that a subject with a given set of relevant characteristics will not experience the event of interest through time t, or will "survive" beyond t. In the Cox model, the survivor function has the form given by equation 2:
the probability that subject j with characteristics given by X j does not experience the event or survives through t, the chosen time horizon.
S 0 (t) = the "baseline" survival probability for the chosen time horizon t.
q j = an equation that incorporates the estimated coefficients or weights that describe how each included characteristic variable in X j affects the probability that subject j survives beyond t.
The formula for q j , in turn, is given in equation 3:
where X j B has the same definition as it does in equation (1) above.
In the Cox model, the baseline hazard and survival probabilities are the same for all subjects and depend only on time. This specification implies that the ratio of the hazards of any two subjects is constant over time and is the reason this specification is called a proportional hazard model. 9 Model estimation generates the estimates of the baseline probabilities and the coefficients or weights on the characteristic variables that indicate the effect of each included variable on the likelihood that a subject experiences the event of interest. As a result, the expected signs of the variables in the survivor function appear to be counterintuitive. The estimation also provides measures of the statistical significance of each included characteristic variable and the entire set of variables taken together. This provides insight into the degree of confidence that can be placed on the coefficient estimates and the generated failure or survival probabilities that they imply.
Using a hazard model rather than a binary logit model specification has several advantages. Unlike the logit model, hazard models take the timing of events over the interval of observation into account. Hazard models also permit the inclusion of subjects that are censored in the estimation sample. The Cox proportional hazard model also offers a potential advantage over alternative hazard models in that no assumption is made about how the baseline hazard varies over time. 10 This is appropriate in situations when there is no strong a priori reason to expect a particular relationship.
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In this paper the event of interest is the downgrade of a bank from low-risk (CAMELS 1 or 2) to high-risk status (CAMELS 3, 4, or 5) during the period of observation. Event time is measured in quarters. The estimated baseline survival probabilities and survivor functions are used to generate estimates of the likelihood that a sample bank with a given set of characteristics will not be downgraded to high-risk status through the end of each of eight quarters beginning one quarter after the end of the forecast year. Given any quarterly time horizon, lower estimated survival probabilities imply higher bank risk, while higher probabilities imply lower risk.
Data Sets Used to Estimate the Model
For simplicity and to permit a reasonable test of out-of-sample forecast accuracy, models are estimated using only year-end annual data for the explanatory variables. Separate models are estimated for 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002 . The estimation sample for each time period consists of low-risk national banks with total assets of $1 billion or less. 12 Credit-card banks, banks in existence fewer than three years, and banks that were downgraded or disappeared during the first quarter of the subsequent year are excluded from the estimation samples.
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For each of the five year-end estimation dates, sample banks are followed over the eightquarter period beginning with the second quarter of the subsequent year. Each bank in the sample was assigned an event time value representing the number of quarters that elapsed between the start of the interval and the quarter in which it was downgraded, disappeared, or ceased to be a national bank. 14 Banks that were not downgraded over the entire period were also treated as censored and assigned a maximum time value of eight quarters. 
Selection of Explanatory Variables Used in the Models
The primary aim of the paper is to investigate the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of relatively simple, low-cost EWMs. Judgment, a modicum of preliminary statistical analysis, and examination of in-sample classification accuracy were used to cull a relatively small set of the most informative variables from a modest list of candidates used in previous empirical early warning studies in each estimation year. The final specification of the downgrade equation for 12 The asset size cutoff is not adjusted for price changes over time. 13 There are two reasons for excluding downgrades in the first quarter after the estimation date. One is the lag in the availability of the final call report data used to construct most of the explanatory variables. The other is the minimal practical value of predicting downgrades at this time horizon.
14 Banks might disappear through merger, failure, or voluntary liquidation. A national bank also can switch to a state charter. When a bank change occurs, its CAMELS rating no longer is available. Both types of banks are treated as censored in the analysis. 15 Technically, the latter two groups of banks are treated as censored in the analysis.
each time period consists of explanatory variables that were found to be individually and collectively significant, exhibited reasonable coefficient signs, and produced decent in-sample forecasts. A more detailed discussion of the signs and significance of the coefficients on the included variables are included in the following section. The differences in the specifications for each time period are relatively modest, indicating that the downgrade models are somewhat but not completely stable. Still, a total of only 20 different explanatory variables appear in the five estimated equations. Some variability in specifications across the five models may simply reflect the effects of multicollinearity. A more informative test of the effects of model instability is the relative forecasting accuracy of the alternative model specifications out-of-sample, which is examined below.
IV. Hazard Model Estimates
Almost all of the explanatory variables appearing in the models are ratios constructed from regulatory call reports filed by all banks. Most of these ratios, or some related variant, consistently appear in many of the models estimated in previous empirical studies because they reflect alternative dimensions of bank risk that should be captured in CAMELS composite scores.
In table 1, the first two variables used in the models are alternative indicators of bank capital adequacy. The first is the ratio of total equity to total assets. The second simply substitutes tangible equity capital in the numerator. The risk of a downgrade should be lower for banks with higher capital ratios, so the coefficients on the two capital measures in the estimated equations should be negative.
The next eight explanatory variables in the table are indicators of credit risk. The first of these ratios is total noncurrent loans divided by total loans. 16 The second is loans past due 30-89 days divided by total loans. The third, total nonperforming loans relative to total loans, is simply the sum of the previous two ratios. Preliminary results supported the use of the disaggregated components in all of the years except 1997.
The next of the credit-risk variables is loan-loss provision divided by total assets. The fifth credit-risk variable is the reserve for loan losses divided by total loans. The sixth is the ratio 16 Noncurrent loans are the sum of nonaccrual loans and loans past due 90 days or more.
of total loans to total assets. The seventh is total commercial and industrial (C&I) loans divided by total assets. The eighth and final credit-risk indicator includes both C&I and commercial real estate loans in the numerator. 17 Higher values of all of these variables except the loan-loss reserve measure imply greater credit risk. Because banks with more credit risk are more likely to be downgraded, the estimated coefficient on all of these variables except the loan-loss reserve ratio should be positive. A negative coefficient is expected on the loan-loss reserve ratio. Table 1 lists one variable that is an indicator of profitability: pretax return on assets.
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More profitable banks are less likely to be downgraded, so a negative coefficient on this variable is expected in the estimated equations.
The next four variables in table 1 are ratios that can be interpreted as measures of liquidity, although several might also be viewed as indicators of a bank's cost of funds. The first of these variables is total nonmaturity deposits divided by total assets. 19 The numerator of this ratio is the sum of transactions deposits, savings deposits, and money market deposit accounts (MMDA). Higher values of this ratio indicate greater bank liquidity and a lower downgrade risk, so the expected coefficient sign on this variable is negative. The next two variables are ratios that capture the extent to which a bank relies on more volatile liabilities for funding. One measure is brokered deposits divided by total assets; the other is borrowed funds with less than one year to maturity divided by total assets. Higher ratios of volatile liabilities imply less liquidity, a higher downgrade risk, and thus a positive estimated coefficient. The final liquidity indicator is total investment securities divided by total assets. Higher values of this ratio imply greater liquidity and a lower downgrade risk, so the expected coefficient sign of this variable is negative.
The next two variables in table 1 are crude indicators of interest rate risk. Both have total assets in the denominator. The first ratio has total loans that mature or reprice in five or more years in the numerator. The second ratio substitutes total assets that mature or reprice in five years or more in the numerator. Higher values of these ratios imply more interest rate risk and so the expected coefficients of each are positive.
The ratio of net gains on loans sold divided by total assets was found to be significant with a positive sign in Whalen (2005) when the 1997 model was estimated. This variable had not been found to be an important determinant of bank risk in other early warning studies. One possible explanation for a positive coefficient is that supervisors view loan sales as a nearly last resort of banks with weakening performance. It could also reflect a belief that the quality of the retained loan portfolio is being reduced by the sale of higher quality assets.
A measure of bank size, the log of total assets appears in the 1997 and 1999 models with a negative significant coefficient implying that larger size is associated with lower downgrade risk. This result probably reflects an actual or perceived size-related diversification benefit.
The final variable that appears in four of the five models is an indicator of management quality, derived from proprietary exam data. This variable is a dummy variable and takes on a value of one for banks where the management component score exceeds its overall CAMELS composite rating. Because higher values indicate greater risk in this rating system, banks with values of 1 for this variable have relatively lower management quality. Banks with lower management quality are more likely to suffer downgrades in their composite rating, so the coefficient on this variable is expected to be positive.
V. Analysis of Model Accuracy
The most meaningful test of the classification accuracy of any EWM is how well it identifies high-and low-risk banks out-of-sample. 20 To evaluate classification accuracy, predicted risk classifications must be generated using the estimated models and compared with actual classifications. Technically the estimated survivor functions can produce estimates of the likelihood that a bank with a given set of characteristics will survive any number of quarters up to a maximum of eight without being downgraded. This paper focuses on the last quarter of the interval or alternatively on predictions of the probability that a bank with some set of characteristics is not downgraded over the ensuing eight quarters.
To obtain predicted risk classifications, a critical survival probability cutoff threshold must be selected to separate banks with predicted high downgrade risk from those with low risk.
Banks with predicted survival probabilities less than or equal to the critical cutoff value are classified as high risk or predicted downgrades. Those with predicted survival probabilities above the critical value are classified as low risk or predicted not to be non-downgraded. Once this classification process is completed, these predictions can be compared with actual outcomes to determine the frequency of correct and incorrect classifications made using each model.
There are two types of classification error that can be made using an EWM. One, labeled a Type I error, occurs when the model predictions fail to correctly identify true high-risk banks.
In this study, this means classifying an actual downgrade as a non-downgrade. A Type II error results when the model misclassifies a true low-risk bank as high risk. Here this means predicting a downgrade for a bank that does not actually occur. Both of these sorts of errors are of concern when analyzing the accuracy of EWMs. The costs of Type I errors are obvious. But if off-site 20 That is using the estimated model to predict downgrades for banks held out of the estimation sample or data from sample banks over a different time period.
EWMs are used to assist in the allocation of supervisory resources, they should not incorrectly flag large numbers of true low-risk banks as warranting closer scrutiny. As a result, the most desirable EWMs have low Type I and Type II error rates.
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Analysis of the accuracy of EWMs is complicated because changing the probability cutoff value used to make the predicted risk classifications changes the number of predicted high-risk and low-risk banks. Raising the critical survival probability cutoff value implies more predicted downgrades, and vice versa. As a result, the measured classification accuracy of this or any other EWM varies with the chosen probability cutoff.
One way to proceed is to examine forecast accuracy using some judgmentally chosen probability cutoff value or range of values. 22 An alternative is to calculate all possible combinations of Type I and Type II error rates produced by the model as the classification cutoff value is allowed to vary over virtually all of its entire range from 0 to 1. The graph of all of these pairs of error rates is known as a power curve. This is the basic approach taken here and is described in more detail below.
The forecasting exercise in this paper is designed to closely resemble the process that would be used if this sort of EWM were actually employed by supervisors. For example, the 1997 model could be estimated only after downgrade information through the end of the first quarter of 2000 was available. Thus this model would be available for forecasting only after that date. It seems reasonable to assume that it could be used when 2000 final year-end call-report 21 Accuracy is analyzed in terms of error rates rather than number of errors because the number of high-and low-risk banks in a given sample may differ considerably. The Type I error rate is the number of true high-risk banks missed by the model divided by the total number of true high-risk banks in the sample. The Type II error rate is defined similarly. 22 For example, often the probability is set equal to the relative frequency of high-risk or low-risk banks observed in the estimation sample. 24 For each model in each forecast year, the sample banks are ranked from predicted lowest survival probability (highest downgrade risk) to highest survival probability (lowest downgrade risk) at an eight-quarter time horizon. Next, the probability cutoff value is alternatively assumed to be equal to each predicted ascending survival probability value observed. For each successive threshold, all banks with probabilities of not being downgraded equal to or less than that threshold are predicted to be high risk, and those with probabilities above this value are predicted to be low risk. The implied Type I and Type II error rates produced by the model for each cutoff value are then computed.
This exercise amounts to creating a series of ever larger supervisory "watch lists" where each list includes all banks with probabilities less than or equal to each respective survival probability threshold value. The risk-ranking data also reveal how many true high-risk and lowrisk banks will be on a watch list of any given size. More accurate models will correctly identify a given percentage of true high-risk banks with a shorter watch list. Alternatively, more accurate models have a lower Type II error rate for any given Type I error rate.
23 Typically, final call-report data are available roughly 45 days after the end of each calendar quarter. 24 2007 is the last year-end forecast period examined because actual downgrade data beyond 2010:Q1
were not yet available when this analysis was done. Tables 2 through 6 risk banks in the more distant future. This sort of error suggests that the associated conventional Type II error rates reported in some panels are overstated to some extent.
Accuracy of Hazard Downgrade Models
The last column of each panel shows the number of banks on each watch list considered to be Type II errors in the forecast period that were actually downgraded during the next four quarters after the end of the forecast period. 26 The short time interval between the end of the forecast period and these near-term subsequent downgrades suggests that model classification of these banks as higher risk in the forecast period was not wrong and so the true Type II error rate is lower than the percentage reported in the table.
In general, the results in tables 2 through 6 suggest a watch list size of 500 banks is necessary to produce Type I error rates below 40 percent. As a result, the key classification accuracy measures for each model in each feasible forecast year for this watch-list size are reported together in the six panels of represents the number of banks categorized as Type II errors for the forecast period that were actually downgraded during the four quarters that immediately followed. 27 The relatively short time period between the end of the forecast period and their subsequent downgrade suggests that their relatively high-risk ranking by the model was correct. 
VI. Summary and Conclusions
This paper examines the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of a set of Cox proportional hazard composite CAMELS downgrade models estimated at five different year-end dates ranging from 1997 through 2002. The survivor functions of the models are used to predict the probability that a low-risk community bank (composite CAMELS of 1 or 2) will not be downgraded to high-risk status (composite CAMELS of 3, 4, or 5) over an eight-quarter time horizon beginning with the second quarter after the year-end estimation date. The specifications of the models were allowed to differ across the estimation periods, but the set of explanatory variables used in each model was intentionally limited to a small number of statistically significant risk indicators employed in previous empirical work. The intent of this constraint was to investigate the accuracy of simple, low-cost EWMs over time.
Beginning in 2002 and ending in 2007, year-end data for the explanatory variables are used in each model to predict the probability of downgrades over the ensuing eight-quarter period for feasible forecast years. Comparing the accuracy of the models over the forecast years yields interesting findings. When the analysis focuses on the 500 riskiest banks identified by the models, the conventional Type I and Type II error rates of all of the models are almost always in the low-to mid-30 percent range in all forecast years, including the most recent one where the models are used to predict downgrades through the first quarter of 2010. Forecast accuracy does not consistently or sharply decline with model age. This pattern indicates that this type of EWM can be a valuable supervisory tool, even if it is not respecified or re-estimated frequently.
Further research could investigate whether additional data items constructed either from call report or other data sources (e.g., changes in versus levels of the explanatory variables, or indicators of state or local economic conditions) can improve the accuracy of this type of model.
Other interesting issues include the impact of augmenting the sample with larger banks or extending the forecast horizon beyond eight quarters.
